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CONT. DENT. I AT.

D-R-A-F-T

CONTRIBUTION TO NSDM 255

STUDY OF PROVISIONS FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION CONCERNED WITH PHYSICAL SECURITY GUIDELINES AND TRANSFER OF MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY

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Internationally

C. Establishment of Information Exchange Intentionally on Transfers of Material, Equipment and Technology

International

4. Intentional Information Exchange Mechanisms -- Should We? How? Pursuit and Recovery

There are really two problems to be addressed here. One is a problem in rapid communication of information on diversions. The other problem is in taking appropriate action on the information so communicated.

With the rapid growth in nuclear power programs and the attendant increase in amounts of fissionable materials around the world, it seems essential to have faster information exchanges on the status and movements of those materials. Most likely such information exchange should continue to be handled through an international organization such as IAEA (and possibly EURATOM in Western Europe). This would certainly involve vastly improving IAEA communications.

The US needs rapid communication of information on diversion in at least two circumstances: 1) cases in which US-supplied materials or equipment are involved; or 2) cases in which US interests are potentially threatened by the diverted material. Such communication of information should probably be handled through established State Department channels.

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The action to be taken -- a pursuit and recovery operation -most logically should be the responsibility of the country in
which the diversion occurs. As such, procedures and
standards for pursuit and recovery should be made part of
section B of this paper. The response to such a terrorist
diversion could be made most rapidly by indigenous police
organizations. Furthermore, it seems highly unlikely that most
countries would permit US security forces to carry out pursuit
and recovery operations within their borders. Nevertheless,
US security officers should be available to assist in
recovering US material if such assistance is requested.